Leyte Gulf 1944 (1) Spiral-Bound | 2021-11-23

In The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Imperial Japanese Navy's Center Force took part in two major actions during the course of the battle: the intense air attacks from U.S. Navy carriers on October 24 (the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, which accounted for super battleship Musashi), and the compelling action off Samar the following day. A considerable body of myth surrounds the latter, since most accounts of the Samar fighting assume it to have been a crushing Imperial Japanese Navy victor--in truth, the result was anything but that. This book examines in detail why, following the Samar action, the Imperial Japanese Navy commander of the Center Force, Takeo Kurita, choose to ignore orders and break off the attack into Leyte Gulf--one of the two most controversial decisions of the entire battle. In the first of two volumes, Mark Stille examines the Japanese planning for Leyte Gulf, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial Japanese Navy in this phase of the war alongside the U.S. Navy's planning and command arrangements, which had the potential to end in disaster. This book also focuses on the commanders on each side whose decisions shaped this definitive battle.